. The travelling starts again. Work has to be done standing, walking, driving, flying. The most urgent conferences are held on the stairs, in the hall, at the door, or on the way to the station. You hardly have time to think. You are carried by train, motor car and aeroplane this way and that through Germany. You arrive at a town half an hour before the beginning of a meeting, or sometimes even later, go up to the platform, and speak.

The audience generally has no idea of what the speaker has already gone through during the day before he delivers his address in the evening. Many of them, surely, imagine that he has nothing to do but make speeches! They misjudge him if he is tired and not quite in form. They regret that his oration leaves something to be desired, that he is not particularly witty, and that his choice of words is not happy. And in the mean time, he is struggling with the heat, with finding the right word, with the sequence of a thought, with a voice that grows hoarser and hoarser, with the cussedness of poor acoustics, and with the bad air from 10,000 tightly-packed people . . . . When the speech is over, you feel as though you've just been hauled fully-clothed out of a hot bath. Then you get back in the car and drive another two hours over bad roads. ³

I believe there is nothing that the fellow can't twist to mean its opposite. Physically a dwarf, intellectually a giant. But a giant only in the art of pulling down, of destruction. A Mephistopheles! Such cripples should not be given power, otherwise they plunge the whole world into ruin, simply to appease their accursed and suppressed complexes. They hate, and must hate, all that is sound and natural, simply because it has been denied them by fate. Herr Goebbels is a model example of this variety of man. ⁴

At the conclusion of the Lausanne Conference, I told Macdonald and Herriot, "You must provide me with a foreign political success, for my Government is the last bourgeois government in Germany. After me there will be only extremists of the Right and the Left." But they did not believe me, and I returned from Lausanne with only partial success . . . .

In the first place, I had to sign it, because otherwise the conference would have ended in a complete failure, and Germany would have been confronted with an economic vacuum. We were faced also with the Reichstag election and I had to try to make the best of the situation. ⁶

From the very first moment, after the reparations were determined in 1921 or so, I fought against this nonsense with the argument that the carrying out of those reparations would throw the entire world into economic chaos. I fought against it and, as time went by, I did succeed in convincing the people of almost all the countries that this was sheer nonsense. Therefore, in July of 1932, if I am not mistaken, the then Reich Chancellor Papen was in a position to affix his signature to an agreement at Lausanne, which reduced reparations, de jure, to a pending sum of 3,000,000,000, and which, de facto, canceled reparations altogether. ⁷

But just as little as we are unable to erase, by a one-sided act, the signatures given since 1918 by former governments, just as little was this possible with regard to the solemn obligations which were undertaken by the then governing parties in the name of the German people. The present Government simply had to liquidate a situation which had been created by all the former governments since the signing of the Versailles Treaty. The question as to whether this situation can be liquidated by Germany's denying the validity of her signature and thus, at the same time, placing herself outside the conception of cultural and other standards, must be answered with an emphatic "no." ⁹

Destiny has given Germany's present rulers more than thirteen years to prove themselves and to show what they can do. They themselves pronounce the most damning judgment on themselves, for by the very nature of their propaganda today, they acknowledge the failure of their efforts. Once they wanted to govern Germany better than it had been governed in the past, and all they can say about their art of governing is that Germany and the German People are not yet dead . . . .

The Almighty who has allowed our numbers to grow from seven to thirteen million in thirteen years, will also permit the thirteen million to form the nucleus from which will grow a new German nation. We believe in a nation. It is for this German nation that we are fighting, and, like thousands of fellow Germans before us, it is to this German nation that we are ready—if called upon—to dedicate ourselves with body and soul. If the nation does its duty, the day must come when once again we shall have a Reich with honor and freedom—work and bread! ¹⁰

We force our way, through the howling mob in Dusseldorf and Elberfeld. A wild trip. We had no idea that things would get so serious. In all our innocence, we drive into Hagen in an open car and wearing our uniforms. The streets are black with people. All of them mob and Communist rabble. They close off the road, so that we can go neither forward nor back . . . .

We cut our way through the middle of the pack. Each of us has his pistol in his hand and is determined, if the worst comes to the worst, to sell his life as dearly as possible . . . . The meeting place is on a hill, framed by a forest of beeches in the background. The Communists have ingeniously set fire to this forest, so that it is almost impossible to carry on the meeting. Nevertheless, we make our speeches . . . .

On our departure we are followed by a bombardment of stones. We manage to leave the city by detours. ¹¹

The experience in Hagen has made us more circumspect. Now we travel in disguise. Constantly we pass lurking groups of Communists. We can hardly get into Dortmund. We have to take a side-street to keep from falling into the hands of the Communists who have occupied all the other entrances. ¹²

A trip to the Ruhr involves mortal peril. We take a strange car, because our own, with its Berlin number, is known, and people have descriptions of it everywhere. In Elberfeld the Red press has called the mob into the streets. The approaches to the stadium are blocked off completely. It is only because they take us for a harmless passenger car that we get through. After a speech, we change into a new car. Again the mob has occupied the streets. But it is dark and so we get through. ¹³

I am no friend of military dictatorship. I regard the dictatorial government of the armed forces in Germany as absolutely impossible . . . . The government must be supported by a strong popular sentiment . . . . [As to the question of the Junkers], the Reichswehr is not a force to protect any classes or interested persons, and no more does it want to protect any obsolete economic forms or untenable property relations. ²⁰

The three-motored plane rolled to a stop. Hitler and several of his associates and adjutants got out. Aside from myself and the courier, there was scarcely anyone at the airport. I kept at a respectful distance, but I saw Hitler reproving one of his companions because the cars had not yet arrived. He paced back and forth angrily, slashing at the tops of his high boots with a dog whip and giving the general impression of a cross, uncontrolled man who treats his associates contemptuously.

This Hitler was very different from the man of calm and civilized manner who had so impressed me at the student meeting. Although I did not give much thought to it, what I was seeing was an example of Hitler's remarkable duplicity—indeed, "multiplicity" would be a better word. With enormous histrionic intuition he could shape his behavior to changing situations in public while letting himself go with his intimates, servants, or adjutants.

The cars came. I took my passenger into my rattling roadster and drove at top speed a few minutes ahead of Hitler's motorcade. In Brandenburg the sidewalks close to the stadium were occupied by Social Democrats and Communists. With my passenger wearing the party uniform, the temper of the crowd grew ugly. When Hitler with his entourage arrived a few minutes later, the demonstrators overflowed into the street. Hitler's car had to force its way through at a snail's pace. Hitler stood erect beside the driver. At that time I felt respect for his courage, and still do. The negative impression that his behavior at the airport had made upon me was wiped out by this scene.

I waited outside the stadium with my car. Consequently I did not hear the speech, only the storms of applause that interrupted Hitler for minutes at a time. When the party anthem indicated the end, we started out again. For that day Hitler was speaking at still a third meeting in the Berlin Stadium. Here, too, the stands were jammed. Thousands who had not been able to obtain admission stood outside in the streets. For hours the crowd waited patiently; once more Hitler was very late. My report to Hanke that Hitler was on his way was promptly announced over the loudspeaker. A roar of applause burst out—incidentally the first and only applause that I myself was ever the cause of. ²¹

Our flatboats were packed—we, my wife and I, were preparing to leave for a boating vacation—and we were to take the train to East Prussia that same night, but when I went to take my leave from Nagel [Speer's assistant] he told me that Hanke—who by now [had] become organizational chief [under Goebbels as Gauleiter] of the Gau Berlin—wanted to see me. And when I hurried over there, he immediately said, "I've been looking for you everywhere. Wouldn't you like to build our new district HQ"? "I said, "Yes, certainly, if you want to entrust it to me."

"I'll propose it to 'the Doctor' [Goebbels] today, Hanke said. A few hours more, and I would have been out of reach in the isolation of the Prussian lakes. For years after that, I considered it the luckiest coincidence of my life. And now? Well, anyway, it shows us how dizzyingly one's whole life can be affected by a few hours more or less . . . .

I worked day and night, easy enough for a 27-year-old with good nerves. A valuable support for me then was a young secretary [Annemarie Kemp] of Goebbels', who took on working overtime to type my tenders at night . . . . I didn't see much of Goebbels. They were preparing for the November election and he only came around a few times, hoarse and worn out, and didn't pretend much interest when we showed him around. ²⁴

Karl Hanke introduced me to him [Speer] in the summer of 1932. Speer had just been given his first architectural commission and a desk in a kind of reception area in his office. Hanke asked me whether I could help him [Speer] a bit in whatever time I had left over after working—yes, unpaid—at the Gau office. I had of course already heard about him when he painted Hanke's office red. So I said, yes sure, and I started giving him a hand. That's also when they began to give me a bit of money.

If I had to say what my first memory is of Speer, t would be of a big table, topsy-turvy full of drawings, designs and color patterns and him reaching out and always finding whatever he wanted, without even looking. The order of his mind even then simply cut through—simply ignored—chaos . . . . He seemed very poised for someone so young. ²⁵

The world does not realize that Germany is confronted with a civil war. The world did not help us to overcome our difficulties at Lausanne, and it is unbearable that, 14 years after the end of the war, there is no equality of rights for us. ²⁷

When I was Chancellor of Germany, in 1932, Schacht came to see me in July or August while I was at home. He said, "Here’s a very intelligent man." It was in the presence of my wife, and I have never forgotten it. He said, "Give him your position. Give it to Hitler. He is the only man who can save Germany." ²⁸

The conclusions to be drawn from the results of this election were that no majority could be formed, from the extreme right to the Social Democrats, without the NSDAP. With that, the Party had achieved a parliamentary key position. The real reason for the increase in the Nazi votes was the desperate economic situation of Germany and the fact of the general disappointment about the lack of foreign political successes at Lausanne. ³⁰

Now we must come to power and exterminate Marxism. One way or another! Something must be done. The time of opposition is ended. Now we go into action. Hitler thinks the same. Events have to sort themselves out, then we must take the decision. We shall not obtain an absolute majority this way. So we shall have to take another path. We face a hard conclusion . . . . We will have a short breathing space, to consolidate our position, but then it will be power and what we can make of it! We must not be modest in our demands. Either sharpest opposition, or power. The middle way is death. That is Hitler's opinion, too . . . . ³¹

We have won a tiny bit . . . . Result: now we must come to power and exterminate [ausrotten] Marxism. One way or another! Something must happen. The time for opposition is over. Now deeds! Hitler is of the same opinion. Now events have to sort themselves out and then decisions have to be taken. We won't get to an absolute majority this way. ³²

Within a week the matter will burst open. Chief will become Reich Chancellor and Prussian Minister President, Strasser Reich and Prussian Interior, Goebbels Prussian and Reich Education, Darré Agriculture in both, Frick state secretary in the Reich Chancellery, Göring Air Ministry. Justice [Ministry] stays with us. Warmbold Economy. Crosigk [i.e. Schwerin von Krosigk] Finance. Schacht Reichsbank. A cabinet of men. If the Reichstag rejects the enabling act, it will be sent packing [nach Hause geschickt]. Hindenburg wants to die with a national cabinet. We will never give up power again. They'll have to carry us out as corpses . . . . I still can't believe it. At the gates of power. ³⁵

The air is full of presage . . . . Telephone call from Berlin. It is full of rumors. The whole party is ready to take over power. The SA down everyday tools to prepare for this. If things go well, everything is all right. If they do not, it will be an awful setback . . . . The SA is in readiness for an alarm and is standing to . . . . The SA are closely concentrated round Berlin; the maneuver is carried out with imposing precision and discipline . . . . The Wilhelmstrasse is very nervous about it. But that is the point of our mobilization. ³⁶

The place of artillery preparation for frontal attack will in future be taken by revolutionary propaganda, to break down the enemy psychologically before the armies begin to function at all . . . . How to achieve the moral break-down of the enemy before the war has started—that is the problem that interests me . . . . We shall provoke a revolution in France as certainly as we shall not have one in Germany. The French will hail me as their deliverer. The little man of the middle class will acclaim us as the bearers of a just social order and eternal peace. None of these people any longer want war or greatness. ⁴²

When I visited Berlin before we came to power, I used to stay at the Kaiserhof; and as I was always accompanied by a complete general staff, I generally had to book a whole floor, and our bill for food and lodging usually came to about 10,000 marks a week. I earned enough to defray these costs, mostly by means of interviews and articles for the foreign press. Towards the end of the Kampfzeit, I was being paid as much as two or three thousand dollars a time for such work. ⁴⁸

Herr Hitler declared that, for reasons which he had explained in detail to the Reich President that morning, his taking any part in cooperation with the existing government was out of the question. Considering the importance of the National Socialist movement, he must demand the leadership of the state to its full extent [die Staatsfuehrung in vollem Umfange] for himself and his party. The Reich President in reply said firmly that he must answer this demand with a clear, unyielding No. He could not justify before God, before his conscience, or before the Fatherland the transfer of the whole authority of government to a single party, especially to a party that was biased against people who had different views from their own. There were a number of other reasons against it, upon which he did not wish to enlarge in detail, such as fear of increased unrest, the effect on foreign countries, etc. Herr Hitler repeated that any other solution was unacceptable to him. To this the Reich President replied: "So you will go into opposition?" Hitler: "I have now no alternative."

At this point Hindenburg, with a certain show of excitement, referred to several recent occurrences—clashes between the Nazis and the police, acts of violence committed by Hitler's followers against those of different opinions, excesses against Jews, and other illegal acts. All these incidents had strengthened him in his conviction that there were numerous wild elements in the Party, beyond effective control. Conflicts with other states had also to be avoided under all circumstances.

Hindenburg proposed to Hitler that he should cooperate with the other parties, in particular with the Right and the Centre, and that he should give up the one-sided idea that he must have complete power. In cooperating with other parties he would be able to show what he could achieve and improve upon. If he could show positive results, he would acquire increasing influence even in a coalition government. This would also be the best way to eliminate the widespread fear that a National Socialist government would make ill use of its power. Hindenburg added that he was ready to accept Hitler and his movement in a coalition government, the precise composition of which could be a subject of negotiation, but that he could not take the responsibility of giving exclusive power to Hitler alone . . . . Hitler, however, was adamant in his refusal to put himself in the position of bargaining with the leaders of the other parties, and of facing a coalition government. ⁵¹

German racial comrades! Anyone amongst you who possesses any feeling for the struggle for the nation's honor and freedom will understand why I am refusing to enter this government. Herr von Papen's justice will in the end condemn perhaps thousands of National Socialists to death. Did anyone think they could put my name as well to this blindly aggressive action, this challenge to the entire people? The gentlemen are mistaken! Herr von Papen, now I know what your bloodstained 'objectivity' is! I want victory for a nationalistic Germany, and annihilation for its Marxist destroyers and corrupters. I am not suited to be the hangman of nationalist freedom fighters of the German people! ⁵⁴

We have got into touch with the Centre Party, if merely by way of bringing pressure to bear upon our adversaries . . . . There are three possibilities. Firstly: Presidential Cabinet. Secondly: Coalition. Thirdly: Opposition . . . . In Berlin, I ascertain that Schleicher already knows of our feelers in the direction of the Centre. That is a way of bringing pressure to bear on him. I endorse and further it. Perhaps we shall succeed thus in expediting the first of these solutions. ⁵⁷

Since about 1930 or 1931 I had known Count Helldorf in Berlin, whose name as a National Socialist is known. He was a regimental comrade of mine in my squadron, and we went through 4 years of war together. Through him I became acquainted with National Socialism in Berlin for the first time. I had asked him at that time to arrange a meeting with Hitler for me. He did so that time, as far as I remember, through the mediation of Herr Roehm. I visited Adolf Hitler and had a long discussion with him at that time, that is to say, Adolf Hitler explained his ideas on the situation in the summer of 1932 to me . . . .

Adolf Hitler made a considerable impression on me even then. I noticed particularly his blue eyes in his generally dark appearance, and then, perhaps as outstanding, his detached, I should say reserved—not unapproachable, but reserved—nature, and the manner in which he expressed his thoughts. These thoughts and statements always had something final and definite about them, and they appeared to come from his innermost self. I had the impression that I was facing a man who knew what he wanted and who had an unshakable will and who was a very strong personality. I can summarize by saying that I left that meeting with Hitler convinced that this man, if anyone, could save Germany from these great difficulties and that distress which existed at the time. ⁵⁹

You have a Monroe Doctrine for America! We believe in a Monroe Doctrine for Germany. You exclude any would-be immigrants you do not care to admit. You regulate their number. You demand that they come up to a certain physical standard. You insist that they bring in a certain amount of money. You examine them as to their political opinions. We demand the same right. We have no concern with the Jews of other lands. But we are concerned about any anti-German elements in our own country. And we demand the right to deal with them as we see fit. Jews have been the proponents of subversive anti-German movements and as such, must be dealt with.

Under the rules of democracy a majority of 51 per cent governs. I have 37 per cent of the total vote, which means that I have 75 per cent of the power that is necessary to govern. That means that I am entitled to three fourths of the power and my opponents to one-fourth.

I have my safe position. I can wait. I now have 13.7 million voters. Next time I will have 14 to 15 million, and so it will go on. In the run-off elections for President, I stood alone, yet there were 13 million voters for me. That is my hard-earned capital, which no one can take from me. I slaved for it and risked my life for it. Without my party, no one can govern Germany today. We bring into the business of government 75 per cent of the capital investment. Whoever furnishes the rest, whether it be the President or the parties, contributes only 25 per cent.

And this takes no account of the plain truth that every unit of my investment is worth twice that of the others. My 15 million voters are in reality worth 30 million. I have the bravest, the most energetic, and in every way the best German material in Germany—and the best disciplined, too. I don't have to march on Berlin as they say I propose to do. I am already there. The question is who will march out of Berlin. My capital represents no mean investment. It can be put to work in the business of government forthwith, without any majority votes, commissions, or committees. It can be put to work on the say-so of one man [meaning Hindenburg].

I have no formal bloc in mind, but you must remember that Europe is accustomed to being governed by systems which extend over many centuries. Governmental systems have often crossed frontiers, acquired local color, and continued to flourish. Mussolini has said that Fascism is not an article of export. I can say the same of National Socialism. Yet people are coming to me from every country in Europe to ask me for my recipe for government. They want my advice on how to launch movements in their own country. I tell them I have no general recipe.

Yet there are certain ideas of government that have general application, with allowances made for local differences. Europe cannot maintain itself in the uncertain currents of democracy. Europe needs some kind of authoritarian government. Formerly it was the monarch who provided this authority. Or an institution like the Catholic Church. The Holy Roman Empire is an example. The authority can assume different forms.

But parliamentarism is not native to us and does not belong to our tradition. The parliamentary system has never functioned in Europe. Yet we cannot substitute brute force. No government can maintain itself for any length of time by sitting on bayonets. It must have the support of the masses. You cannot establish a dictatorship in a vacuum.

A government that does not derive its strength from the people will fail in a foreign crisis. The soldier and the policeman do not constitute a state. Yet dictatorship is justified if the people declare their confidence in one man and ask him to lead. ⁶¹

Although he [von Schleicher] outwardly betrays nothing, he is, in reality, in deadly fear of a possible union of the Führer with the Centre . . . . He will accept a coalition, but not join it himself. His idea is a Presidential Cabinet; if it comes to nothing, he will resign . . . . I don't know if what he says is true or false. Either way, I have the impression that they want to lure us into a trap again. They are trying in a devious way to obtain the result they failed to achieve on 13 August. They believe they can scare us with the dissolution of the Reichstag—a little nationalist plan that we shall soon frustrate. I report by phone to the Führer; he agrees with everything. ⁶⁴

The licentiousness emanating from the appeal of the leader of the National Socialist movement does not comply very well with his claims to governmental power . . . . I do not concede him the right to regard only the minority following his banner as the German nation—and to treat all other fellow countrymen as free game . . . . I shall, if necessary, force recognition of the equal justice that is the right of all German citizens. I am firmly resolved to stamp out the smouldering flame of civil war. ⁶⁵

Those of you who possess a feel for the struggle for the honor and freedom of the nation will understand why I refused to enter this bourgeois government. With this deed [the death sentences for the Potempa Murderers], our attitude towards this national cabinet is prescribed once and for all . . . . Herr von Papen, I understand your bloody "objectivity" now. I wish that victory may come to nationalist Germany and destruction upon its Marxist destroyers and spoilers, but I am certainly not fitted to be the executioner of nationalist fighters for the liberty of the German people. ⁶⁷

But what you could perhaps do with in these days, is a kind word. Your movement is carried internally by so strong a truth and necessity that victory in one form or another cannot elude you for long . . . . Wherever my work may take me in the near future, even if you should see me one day behind stone walls, you can always count on me as your reliable assistant . . . . With a vigorous Heil. ⁶⁸

The hope in the hearts of millions of national socialists can be fulfilled only by an authoritarian government. The problem of forming a cabinet on the basis of a parliamentary coalition has again been brought into the field of public political discussion. If such negotiations, in the face of growing distress, are conducted with the [motive] of destroying the political opponent by the failure of his governmental activity, this is a dangerous game against which one cannot warn enough. In the last analysis, such plans can mean nothing else but a tactic [that] counts on the possibility that matters will get worse for the people and that the faith of millions will turn into the bitterest disappointment, if these tactics only result in the destruction of the political adversary.

It is within the nature of such party-tactical maneuvers that they are veiled and will be disclaimed in public. That, however, cannot prevent me from warning publicly against such plans, about which it may be undecided who is the betrayer and who the betrayed one; plans, though, which will certainly cheat the German people out of their hope for improvement of their situation. Nothing can prove more urgently the necessity for an authoritarian government than such a prospect of maneuvers of a tactical game by the parties. ⁷⁴

The new Reichstag met according to the Constitution. My Government . . . could not obtain a majority; but the formation of any other government without Hitler was quite impossible. Therefore, I was justified in the hope that this Reichstag would give my Government time to test itself, especially as I had submitted to it a comprehensive and decisive economic program. But just then, something unexpected and unheard-of happened. The thing that happened was, so to speak, the prostitution of the German Parliament. Herr Göring, the President of the German Reichstag, gave to the Communist delegate, Clara Zetkin, the floor for a vehement attack on my Government. When I, the responsible Chancellor of this Government, asked for the floor in order to give an account of what I wanted to do, I was refused permission to speak, and the Reichstag President asked for a vote on a motion of no confidence brought in by the Communists, the Socialists, and the National Socialists.

The fact of this concerted motion on the part of the three parties should really show what would have taken place in Germany if these three parties were to have ruled in Germany together, and should also show how imperative it was for me to try not to crowd National Socialism into the leftist wing, but to bring it into my Government instead. I was forced to put the order for the dissolution of the Reichstag on the table, and to leave. ⁷⁹

Now we are in for elections again! One sometimes feels this sort of thing is going on for ever . . . . Our adversaries count on our losing morale, and getting fagged out. But we know this and will not oblige them. We would be lost and all our work would have been in vain if we gave in now . . . . even if the struggle should seem hopeless . . . . The organization has naturally become a bit on edge through these everlasting elections. It is as jaded as a battalion [that] has been too long in the trenches, and just as nervy. The numerous difficulties are wearing me out . . . . Money is extraordinarily difficult to obtain. All gentlemen of "Property and Education" are standing by the Government. ⁸¹

The Disarmament Conference had been created by the League of Nations for the purpose of bringing about the disarmament of all nations, which was provided for in Article 8 as an equivalent for the German disarmament which had already been carried out by 1927. The negotiations during this Disarmament Conference were, however, suspended after a short time, despite the objections of the German representatives. The preceding negotiations and this adjournment made it quite clear, even at that time, that those states which had not disarmed were not prepared to carry through their own disarmament in accordance with the standards and methods applied to Germany's previous disarmament. This fact made it impossible for Germany to accept a resolution which had been proposed to the Disarmament Conference at this time, and the German representative therefore received instructions to declare that Germany would not participate in the work of the Disarmament Conference as long as Germany's equal right to equal participation in the results of the conference was not recognized. ⁸²

What a long way we have come in six years. From the basement in Potsdamer Strasse to the new district house in the Vosstrasse! Now we shall probably also succeed in crossing the last four hundred yards to the Wilhelmstrasse. The house is in perfect order. Dignified quarters for the work of a great movement. ⁸⁴

A few days after the dedication Hitler inspected the district headquarters, which was named after him. I heard that he liked what he saw, which filled me with pride, although I was not sure whether he had praised the architectural simplicity I had striven for, or the ornateness of the original Wilhelmine structure. Soon afterward I returned to my Mannheim office. Nothing had changed; the economic situation and therefore the prospect of commissions had grown worse, if anything. Political conditions were becoming even more confused. One crisis followed on the heels of another, and we paid no attention. For us, things went on as before. ⁸⁵

Tens of thousands of boys and girls stood in formation on the field. When Hitler stood alone at the front of the platform, a fantastic cry went up into the night, a sound of matchless jubilation. Then he raised his arms and dead silence fell. He burst into a flaming address which lasted scarcely fifteen minutes. Again he was the old Hitler, spontaneous, fiery, full of appeal. ⁸⁶

The essence of conservative ideology is its being anchored in the divine order of things. That, too, is its fundamental difference compared with the doctrine advocated by the NSDAP. The principle of 'exclusiveness' of a political 'everything or nothing' which the latter adheres to, its mythical Messiah-belief in the bombastic Führer who alone is destined to direct fate, gives it the character of a political sect. And therein I see the unbridgeable cleavage between a conservative policy born of faith and a national-socialist creed as a matter of politics. It seems to me that today, names and individuals are unimportant when Germany's final fate is at stake. What the nation demands is this: it expects of a movement which has written upon its banner the internal and external national freedom that it will act, at all times and under all circumstances, as if it were the spiritual, social and political conscience of the nation. If it does not act that way; if this movement follows merely tactical points of view, democratic-parliamentarian points of view, if it engages in the soliciting of mass support using demagogic agitation as a means of proletarian class struggle then it is not a movement any more, it has become a political party. And, indeed, the Reich was almost destroyed by the political parties. One simply cannot, on one side, despise mercilessly masses and majorities, as Herr Hitler is doing, and on the other hand surrender to parliamentarian democracy; surrender to the extent of adopting resolutions against one's own government together with Bolshevists. ⁹²

'The entire Press is furious with us and calls it Bolshevism; but as a matter of fact, we had no option. If we had held ourselves aloof from this strike, our position among the working classes would have been shaken. Here, a great occasion offers once again of demonstrating to the public that the line we have taken up in politics is dictated by a true sympathy with the people, and for this reason the N.S. party purposely eschews the old bourgeois methods . . . . We are in a by no means envious position. Many bourgeois circles are frightened off by our participation in the strike. But that's not decisive. These circles can later be very easily won back. But if we'd have once lost the workers, they'd have been lost for ever. ⁹⁹

It is the exclusiveness of your Movement, your demand for everything or nothing, which the Reich President could not recognize and which led to his decision of 13 August. What is at stake today is this: The question is not whether this or that party leader occupies the Chancellor's chair, whether his name is Brüning, Hitler, or von Papen, but rather that we meet on common ground so that the vital interests of the German people can be assured. ¹⁰⁰

 
 
 





Written by Walther Johann von Löpp

Copyright © 2011-2013 All Rights Reserved
 

Edited by Levi Bookin — Copy Editor

European History and Jewish Studies



 
 
 
 
 



  
  
Click to join 3rdReichStudies